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Charles E. Colman*
The great peculiarity of the privacy cases is their predominant, though not
exclusive, focus on sexuality - not 'sex' as such, of course, but sexuality
in the broad sense of that term: the network of decisions and conduct re-
lating to the conditions under which sex is permissible, the social institu-
tions surrounding sexual relationships, and the procreative consequences
of sex. Nothing in the privacy cases says that the doctrine must gravitate
around sexuality. Nevertheless, it has.
- Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy'
I. TELLING STORIES
In December of 1890, the Harvard Law Review published an arti-
cle, coauthored by Boston law firm partners Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis, titled The Right to Privacy.2 The piece reflected on the
harms caused by gossip and press intrusions into people's private
lives,3 and argued that judges could (and should) make use of existing
legal authority to recognize a new tort for the invasion of individual
privacy4 One hundred and twenty-five years after its publication, The
Right to Privacy enjoys a reputation as one of the most famous and in-
fluential law review articles ever written, having played a notable role
in the Supreme Court's development of a constitutional right to per-
sonal autonomy.5
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1 Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 744 (1989).
2 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. '93 (1890).
See id. at 196 ("The press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety
and of decency.").
4 See id. at 198 ("The common law secures to each individual the right of determining, ordi-
narily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be communicated to others.").
5 For a range of views on the article's historical significance, reputation, and influence, see,
for example, STUART BANNER, AMERICAN PROPERTY: A HISTORY OF How, WHY, AND
WHAT WE OWN 138 (2011) (calling The Right to Privacy "the most well-known piece of legal
scholarship in American history"); SAMANTHA BARBAS, LAWS OF IMAGE: PRIVACY AND PUB-
LICITY IN AMERICA 39 (2015) ("The Right to Privacy' was dissected, discussed, and praised in
popular and legal journals - remarkable for a law review article."); James H. Barron, Warren
and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. '93 (189o): Demystifying a Landmark Cita-
tion, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875 (1979) (discussing the "hallowed place" of the article "in both
legal literature and history," id. at 876, while simultaneously positing a disconnect between the
precise nature of the article's influence and possible authorial intent, id. at 88o); William M.
Beaney, The Right to Privacy and American Law, 31 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 257, 258 (1966)
(acknowledging that the "famous" article is the "usual starting point in any discussion of the
growth of the legal concept of privacy" in the United States, id. at 257, but asserting that "[i]t
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Because The Right to Privacy has loomed so large in the American
legal consciousness for so long (and, no doubt, because it has been in-
voked in Supreme Court decisions on some of the most controversial
issues of the past century6 ), many scholars have displayed curiosity
about the article's backstory. Legal historian Stuart Banner summa-
rizes the bulk of such scholarly musings thusly: "The traditional expla-
nation of the origin of 'The Right to Privacy' emphasizes Warren's ir-
ritation with sensationalist press coverage of his daughter's wedding."
As Banner notes, this conventional account must be apocryphal, given
that Warren's daughter was only six years old when her father took
the lead on the 1890 article.8
Despite the chronological impossibility of this story, scholars echoed
it for decades (likely due, in part, to its appearance in another influen-
tial law review article on privacy, written by Dean William Prosser in
19609). Recently, however, more probing explanations of the article's
origin have begun to appear. Several scholars, for example, have ex-
plored the role of newly affordable and portable photographic technol-
ogy in the years leading up to the article's publication.10
would be inaccurate to credit the tort concept of the Warren-Brandeis right to privacy with effect-
ing any significant change in American life," id. at 258); William S. Gyves, Note, The Right to
Privacy One Hundred Years Later: New York Stands Firm as the World and Law Around It
Change, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 315, 316 n.2 (rggo) ("The Warren and Brandeis collaboration is
widely considered the most famous and influential law review article of all time.").
6 See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001); Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v.
Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 554 (1985); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 510 n.i
(1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
7 BANNER, supra note 5, at 138. Banner dismisses the notion that it is "necessary" to explore
the "personal motive[s]" behind the writing of The Right to Privacy, declaring: "In the social cir-
cles in which Warren and Brandeis moved, few would have disagreed that the press was becom-
ing too aggressive in invading personal privacy. Their legal argument was new, but in criticizing
the press they were merely voicing conventional opinion." Id. at 138; see also id. at 318 n.r8.
There is room for debate on this point. See BARBAS, supra note 5, at 40-43. There is a great
deal more room for disagreement about how to determine whether a given scholarly inquiry is
"necessary." See infra p. 131.
8 BANNER, supra note 5, at 138.
9 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 383 (g6o). Prosser's article is still fre-
quently cited for that proposition. See, e.g., Christine Hart, Note, Y.G. v. Jewish Hospital of St.
Louis: Breathing Life into the "Disclosure of Private Facts" Tort, 35 ST. Louis U. L.J. 931, 933
(gg) (citing Prosser, supra); see also Beaney, supra note 5, at 257 (noting in 1966 that it was "fre-
quently reported without much comment that the article was occasioned by the prying, gossipy
accounts of the social activities of members of Warren's family in a Boston newspaper that spe-
cialized in such revelations").
10 See, e.g., Robert E. Mensel, "Kodakers Lying in Wait": Amateur Photography and the Right
of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 Am. Q. 24 (gg); see also Samantha Barbas, Saving Pri-
vacy from History, 61 DEPAUL L. REV. 973, 973 (2012) ("Warren and Brandeis envisioned the
'right to privacy' as a means to address what were perceived as serious threats to privacy and
identity posed by the new media of the day - yellow journalism, gossip columns, and kodak
photography.").
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Even so, "what truly provoked Warren, who is thought to be the
moving force behind the article, has remained a mystery."" This
statement by law and journalism scholar Amy Gajda in 2008 remains
accurate today, despite Gajda's careful survey of "news coverage that
might explain the authors' personal stake in the legal crusade they
launched." 12 Gajda, for her part, concluded that "Samuel D. Warren
bristled at the way the press reported on [the prominent political fami-
ly into which he married] and that such coverage motivated the arti-
cle." 13 Yet one cannot help but feel that important pieces of the puzzle
are still missing.
11 Amy Gajda, What If Samuel D. Warren Hadn't Married a Senator's Daughter?: Uncovering
the Press Coverage that Led to "The Right to Privacy," 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 35, 37 (footnote
omitted).
12 Id. at 41-13 Id. at 40. See MARTIN GREEN, THE MOUNT VERNON STREET WARRENS: A BOSTON
STORY, r86o-Iglo, at lo5 (1989). Not surprisingly, given Brandeis's later stature, he has fre-
quently - and likely inaccurately - been promoted to lead, or even sole, author by twentieth-
century commentators. See, e.g., BARBAS, supra note 5, at 36-37 (stating that although the article
was "attributed to Warren and Brandeis," id. at 36, it was "written largely by Brandeis," id. at
37). For this proposition, Barbas cites Barron, who made this assertion in passing in a 1979 arti-
cle, offering no substantive explanation for the statement. See id. at 225 n.68 (citing Barron, su-
pra note 5, at 911). The assumption that Brandeis was the driving force behind The Right to Pri-
vacy has even prompted explanatory studies, like Barbas's, largely neglecting Warren - even as
such studies note evidence suggesting that Warren was the article's primary author. See, e.g., Neil
M. Richards, The Puzzle of Brandeis, Privacy, and Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1310 (2010)
("Although privacy law scholars have long identified Brandeis as the father of American privacy
law, Brandeis's personal feelings about tort privacy seem to have been deeply ambivalent. While
he remained proud of his legal innovation in this area throughout his life, it does not appear to
have been an issue he gave any significant attention to after 1890, other than in his dissent in
Olmstead v. United States almost forty years later. The editor of his letters concluded that he 'did
not really want to get involved' in Warren's project. In fact, even before the article was published,
Brandeis privately expressed some misgivings about it. . . . Brandeis later confided in his official
biographer Alpheus Mason that '[t]his, like so many of my public activities, I did not volunteer to
do."' (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted)); see also id. at 13'1 ("Brandeis never drafted the
[privacy] statute Warren suggested."). Richards's article nevertheless goes on to try to reconcile
Brandeis's apparent "ambivalence" about privacy and free speech, concluding that Brandeis's
views on privacy and speech must have changed over time. See id. at 1298. In my view, no such
attempt at reconciliation is necessary; Brandeis's willingness to sign on to The Right to Privacy,
like his coauthorship of two earlier Harvard Law Review articles more transparently motivated by
the interests of the Warren family, Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Law of Ponds, 3
HARV. L. REV. I (1889), and Samuel D. Warren, Jr. & Louis D. Brandeis, The Watuppa Pond Cas-
es, 2 HARV. L. REV. 195 (1888), can be most plausibly understood as a demonstration of continu-
ing gratitude to the Warren family. A close family friend of the Warrens for decades, Louis
Brandeis likely felt indebted to the family, and to Sam, in particular, for opening up a world of
professional opportunities that might otherwise have been unavailable to Brandeis. See GREEN,
supra, at 63, 65 (noting, inter alia, that Brandeis was, "in a way, a super-Warren," id. at 63, that
"[ilt was through Sam that [Brandeis] met, for instance, Oliver Wendell Holmes" and that "it was
Sam's contacts that brought the young partners their first opportunities," id. at 65). All of this,
combined with Brandeis's familiarity with Sam's familial priorities and protective instincts, and
his intimate knowledge of the idiosyncrasies of all of the Warren siblings, including Ned, make his
deference to Sam concerning the content and publication of The Right to Privacy perfectly under-
standable - and consistent with his deference to the Warren family's agendas on other occasions.
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While no single account can ever tell "the whole story,"14 there is an
intriguing perspective on The Right to Privacy that has not yet been
explored - even as it has practically begged for attention.15 Resisting
the urge to speculate on the reasons for the scholarly literature's si-
lence on the particular narrative offered here, 16 I proceed to weave an
"origin story" of The Right to Privacy of special resonance for me, in
this personal, cultural, and jurisprudential moment.1
See, e.g., id. at 220 (discussing Brandeis's soft-pedaling, even after Sam's death in igo, of his
support of a progressive agenda, in the form of a minimum wage, to Sam's sister, Cornelia - who
was inclined to oppose such regulation as "subversive to the ideas on which [she] was brought
up"). At the same time, Brandeis was not so closely bound with Sam, let alone with Sam's young-
er brother, Ned, in the public consciousness as to suffer any devastating reputational injury if
Ned's sexual orientation were later exposed in one of the many possible ways I explore below.
14 Legal scholarship, perhaps influenced by the perceived institutional and behavioral dictates
of the U.S. legal system, too often lays claim to exclusive and exhaustive explanations. Such
scholarship frequently ignores that uncertainty is unavoidable in our complex world. We might
benefit from (re)considering to what degree legal scholarship can serve as a corrective to the re-
ductionism of litigation's winner-take-all ethos, rather than instinctively reproducing that ethos in
academic pursuits. When it comes to historical projects, in particular, one must make peace with
the fact that "the probable and the speculative will coexist." C.G. Bateman, Method and Meta-
physics: A Legal Historian's Canon, 23 J. JURIS. 255, 278 n.90 (2014) (quoting G.R. ELTON, THE
PRACTICE OF HISTORY 87 (1967)); see also HAYDEN WHITE, THE CONTENT OF THE FORM
ro (1987) ("Every narrative, however seemingly 'full,' is constructed on the basis of a set of events
that might have been included but were left out . . . ."); Christopher Tomlins, After Critical Legal
History: Scope, Scale, Structure, 8 ANN. REV. L. & Soc. SC. 31 (2012) (offering an illuminating
description of legal historians' varying approaches to indeterminacy over the past several
decades).
15 See ANGUS MCLAREN, SEXUAL BLACKMAIL: A MODERN HISTORY 59-62 (2002)
(sandwiching mention of The Right to Privacy between descriptions of the common late-
nineteenth-century practice of blackmailing gay men, but drawing no explicit connection between
them).
16 With that said, see id. at 293 n.62 (positing that the popular "appeal" of the conventional
account of the article, hinging on "a gentleman's concern for a lady," lies in its "complement[ing]
the stereotyped notion of the active male and the passive female"). Another possibility for the
absence of any account focusing on Ned's gay brother, of course, is that "[tihe lives and achieve-
ments of the Warrens are almost unrecorded - a few 'footnotes to other people's biographies."'
William Bentinck-Smith, Book Review, 63 NEW ENG. Q. 685, 687 (iggo) (reviewing GREEN, su-
pra note 13). Only "'sparse and discreet' family letters, 'often exercises in concealment,' are what
remain for private or intimate information." Id. at 686-87. Fortunately, the Warren about whom
we arguably know the most - Sam's gay younger brother Ned - is a central focus of this essay.
Yet even the "biography" partially authored by him during his lifetime and rewritten and/or ex-
purgated by his friends after his death, provides precious little. See id. at 687 (citing OSBERT
BURDETT & E.H. GODDARD, EDWARD PERRY WARREN: THE BIOGRAPHY OF A CONNOIS-
SEUR (1941)). Thus, like Green in his writing of the family's biography, I will have to be "imagi-
native and industrious in seeking for traces of the Warrens and in telling their story." Id. I wel-
come this opportunity: legal scholarship could use a bit of imagination.
17 See discussion infra Section V; cf WHITE, supra note 14, at ro (observing the apparent hu-
man "need or impulse to rank events with respect to their significance for the culture or group
that is writing its own history"); ELIZABETH WILSON, CULTURAL PASSIONS: FANS, AES-
THETES AND TAROT READERS 20 (2013) ("[AIll academic research is a form of autobiography.")
(quoting Georges Devereux). My approach here was certainly not crafted to avoid elective affini-
ties: after all, this essay grew out of my research for an article, Charles E. Colman, Design and
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II. ABOUT SAM
The leading biography of the Warren family of nineteenth-century
Beacon Hill, Boston, explains that Samuel Warren, Jr., had always
been the striver of the brood. While the "children," as he called his
four younger siblings - Henry (born 1854), Cornelia (born 1857),
Edward (Ned) (born '86a), and Frederick (Fiske) (born 1862) - had
each turned away from "high society" at a young age, Sam doggedly
pursued membership in it.' Indeed, he achieved a foothold in that so-
ciety by marrying into the prominent Bayard family, whose "old mon-
ey" and political power helped to remedy Sam's insecurity about the
Warrens' less established position.1 9
Sam's hunger for status served to fuel his academic and social suc-
cess at Harvard College and Harvard Law School, his membership in
and eventual leadership of important Boston clubs and cultural insti-
tutions, and, of course, his building of a successful law firm, Warren &
Brandeis. 20 Yet, as Amy Gajda's survey of i88as press coverage re-
veals, these achievements earned Sam a decidedly pale patch in the
national spotlight. He was, it seems, perpetually in the background as
his vivacious wife Mabel and the other Bayards glittered in the social
and political limelight. 21
The picture of Sam's relationship with his siblings is altogether dif-
ferent.22 The Warren family, a reflection of "the maelstrom of histori-
cal forces in Boston at the end of the nineteenth century," was a group
with more than its share of secrets and lies.23 Sam's social and profes-
sional ascent (while ultimately less dramatic than he might have
Deviance: Patent as Symbol, Rhetoric as Metric - Part i, 55 JURIMETRICS 419 (2015), in which
I examine the influence of gender and sexuality norms in the deep discourse of turn-of-the-century
design-patent jurisprudence. While immersing myself in materials from and about the 188os, I
stumbled upon a sentence about Sam Warren's gay brother Ned; curiosity struck, and this essay
followed.
18 See GREEN, supra note 13, at xv, 38; DAvID Sox, BACHELORS OF ART EDWARD PERRY
WARREN & THE LEWES HOUSE BROTHERHOOD Io (Iggl).
19 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 38, 103-04. Though the Warren patriarch had accumulated
substantial wealth by 1880, the family - or rather, Sam, the only member of his generation who
apparently cared about such things - had not yet reached the inner circle of elite Boston society.
See Sox, supra note 18, at ro-ii.
20 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 44-45; SOX, supra note 18, at r0-11. Realizing that Louis
Brandeis was one of the great legal minds of their generation, Sam promised intellectual stimula-
tion, social stature, and wealth to lure the future Supreme Court Justice back to Boston, from St.
Louis, where Brandeis had moved after graduating from Harvard Law. See GREEN, supra note
13, at 63.
21 Gajda, supra note ii, at 42 ("[11t was Mabel Bayard who was newsworthy - a senator's
daughter who lived in both Washington and Wilmington - not her intended husband, a lowly
Boston lawyer.").
22 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 48.
23 Martin Green, Book Review, 66 NEW ENG. Q. 340, 341 (1993) (reviewing Sox, supra note
18).
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hoped) increased the likelihood that the public would grow curious
about the dirty laundry of these "barely compatible individualists -
not easily compatible with other, milder people, let alone with each
other." 24 In part because of this strife, Sam "remained a dutiful son"
who was "sentimentally attached" to his siblings long after his mar-
riage into the Bayard family." 25 That sense of duty only intensified af-
ter the family patriarch died in 1888;26 thereafter, Sam "took the posi-
tion of head of the [Warrens] very seriously."27 This aspect of Sam's
life, widely overlooked by legal scholars investigating the backstory of
The Right to Privacy, is central to the narrative I offer below.
The family's biographer notes that Sam's "expression of [his] sense
of responsibility was often unwelcome" among his siblings, even as
they relied on him, to varying degrees, to handle their financial and le-
gal affairs.28 While Sam did use his legal knowledge and fiduciary po-
sitions to exert a certain degree of control over his siblings, his over-
arching goal appears to have been the family's wellbeing and the
preservation of its good name. 29 Indeed, Sam would continue "consci-
entiously representing [his siblings] in public matters" long after they
had reached adulthood.3 0 Certain siblings, however, presented greater
"challenges" than others.
III. ABOUT NED
A great deal of Sam's energy went into his relationship with his
brother Ned. If it is indeed a blessing to "live in interesting times,"
then Edward Perry Warren was dangerously blessed: Ned (eight years
Sam's junior) found himself entering adulthood and achieving an un-
derstanding of his same-sex attraction at the precise moment in Anglo-
American history when scientists and the public first proclaimed and
recognized the existence of men like Ned as a fixed and pathologized
category of persons.3 1
24 GREEN, supra note 13, at 48.
25 Id. at 44.
26 See id. at 81.
27 Id. at 44 (emphasis omitted); Sox, supra note 18, at 71 (discussing the centrality of "the
family dignity" among Sam's priorities, as recited in a letter written by Ned on the heels of their
mother's death in igor).
28 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 62.
29 Id. at 44-45 (speculating that Sam's efforts might have been intended "to compensate and
conciliate the rest of [the Warren siblings], for the various ways in which he irritated or offend-
ed"). According to the family's biographer, Sam was "easier ... to be proud of than to live with."
Id. at 44.
30 Id. at 45.
1 See ANGUS MCLAREN, THE TRIALS OF MASCULINITY: POLICING SEXUAL BOUNDA-
RIES, 1870-1930, at 30 (197).
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A dominant "scientific" notion of homosexuality began to crystallize
in the Anglo-American consciousness in the I88as, and especially in
the few years leading up to Sam's writing of The Right to Privacy.32
Both the conceptualization of and terminology used to describe such
"sexual deviants" ("pederasts," "inverts," etc.) sound foreign today,33
though perhaps not as foreign as the broader cultural logic ascendant
during that time period. For many white, middle-class Americans of
the period, for whom evolutionary theory offered seemingly endless
explanatory power 34 (including, and maybe especially, among the legal
establishment35 ), same-sex intimacy was deeply linked with the notion
of "degeneracy." This new "degeneracy" meant something more than
the moral deterioration previously associated with episodic sodomy. It
was intended to evoke the literal "devolution" of the "race," purported-
ly echoed and facilitated by the social "disorder" of the women's rights
movement, a rapidly rising divorce rate, an increase in prostitution
and venereal disease in urban areas, the imagined effects of large-scale
immigration on the moral and physical well-being of American society,
and a host of other destabilizing phenomena.3 6
The American public living in the large cities on the East Coast
was thus alerted to a supposedly imminent descent into "sexual anar-
chy" during the same decade in which Ned Warren graduated from
Harvard, went on to attend Oxford (where he would more enthusiasti-
cally and overtly embrace his sexuality and come to identify as a de-
vout and vocal Platonic "aesthete"), received and quickly began spend-
ing an enormous annual stipend dispensed after his father's 1888
passing, and convened a group of like-minded gay men to live com-
munally in a Sussex mansion dedicated to the appreciation of art and
sensuality in the ancient Greek tradition.37
32 See ELAINE SHOWALTER, SEXUAL ANARCHY: GENDER AND CULTURE AT THE FIN
DE SIfCLE 14 (1990).
33 The terms "homosexual," "gay," and "same-sex [attraction]" were not consistently used in the
r88os to describe men like Ned, or their sexual conduct; however, I will use such terms for the
sake of convenience. My discussion here does not focus specifically on developments in lesbian
sexology or public understandings thereof, both because they are less directly relevant to the
Warren story and because the history and cultural dynamics thereof are arguably more complicat-
ed than in the context of gay men. See EVE KOSOFSKY SEDGWICK, BETWEEN MEN:
ENGLISH LITERATURE AND MALE HOMOSOCIAL DESIRE 3-5 (2015).
34 See generally CYNTHIA EAGLE RUSSETT, SEXUAL SCIENCE: THE VICTORIAN CON-
STRUCTION OF WOMANHOOD (Iggl).
35 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY & PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF
PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT, 1776-1970, at 245, 251 (1997).
36 See GAIL BEDERMAN, MANLINESS & CIVILIZATION: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF
GENDER AND RACE IN THE UNITED STATES, 1880-I97, at 174-87 (1995); PAUL BOYER,
URBAN MASSES AND MORAL ORDER IN AMERICA, 1820-1920, at 123-29 (1978); Sally Ledger,
The New Woman and the Crisis of Victorianism, in CULTURAL POLITICS AT THE FIN DE
SIfCLE 22, 22-23 (Sally Ledger & Scott McCracken eds., 1995).
37 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 85-90.
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Sam, as a cosmopolitan and highly educated professional, might
well have foreseen the coming "homosexual panic" before most others
experienced it firsthand.38 Regardless, by the time Sam wrote The
Right to Privacy, both the medical profession and the legal system had
decisively pronounced judgment on sexual "deviants" like Ned3 9: "the
new sexual types of the pederast and invert posed a serious sexual
danger. "40 White, middle-class Anglo-American society was quickly
learning to be hypervigilant for41 - and was increasingly inclined to
use the legal system against 42 - homosexual men in the very same
years in which Ned was building an increasingly visible gay life for
himself.
Sam took seriously his self-appointed role as the head of the fami-
ly- and the politically savviest of the Warrens - to protect Ned,
perhaps the most vulnerable of the Warren "children." This undertak-
ing likely struck Sam as especially necessary, and difficult, because
Ned's mannerisms, personal interactions, and intellectual and aesthetic
interests would have marked him as a presumptive homosexual in the
eyes of a growing portion of an increasingly suspicious Anglo-
American public.
As Sam had witnessed for years, Ned never made much of an effort
to present himself as "manly" in the way expected of mid-nineteenth-
century Bostonian boys. Indeed, he had often "involuntarily [drawn]
attention to himself" as gay.4 3 Ned's sexual nonconformity would blos-
8 While "[ailmost all the early works on the subject were French or German" - languages
with which Sam would have been acquainted through his education, making it possible for him to
gain "advance" access to such works - there was "increasing interest in ... the United States
from the mid-r88os." GRAHAM ROBB, STRANGERS: HOMOSEXUAL LOVE IN THE NINE-
TEENTH CENTURY 52 (2003); see also id. at 53-57; COLIN SPENCER, HOMOSEXUALITY: A
HISTORY 293 (1995) ("[Such] views did not take long to reach America.")
39 See ROBB, supra note 38, at 54 ("By the end of the r88os, the medical profession was sup-
plying enough information [on 'sexual inversion'] of its own, packaged in [a new, often pseudosci-
entific] terminology, to do without outside help.")
40 MCLAREN, supra note 31, at 30.
41 See SPENCER, supra note 38, at 305 (noting that "the homophobia of [English] society"
reached a "hysterical" level in the 18gos); see also RICHARD SENNETT, THE FALL OF PUBLIC
MAN 164-74 (1974) (noting growing Anglo-American obsession in late-nineteenth-century society,
including its detective literature, with the "phrenological" project of finding visual "clues" that
might reveal a person's true nature).
42 See generally Colman, supra note 17. As I explain in Part i of Design and Deviance, the
reasons for this perception of danger were multifaceted and intertwined with other divisive dis-
courses of the time period. The widespread revelation of "sexual inversion," along with anxiety-
provoking developments in other sociocultural realms, conspired to produce what many Anglo-
American historians have called a "homosexual panic." This panic played a key role in the
passage of the 1885 English law under which famed playwright Oscar Wilde would, just a few
years later, be prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to hard labor for "gross indecency." See infra
Section III, pp. 133-39.
43 GREEN, supra note 13, at 42; see also id. at 40-42.
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som, in the mid-I880s, into a multifaceted identity encapsulated in his
self-identification as a "Uranian."
The Uranian label entailed not only same-sex attraction, but a
comprehensive philosophy endorsed (albeit largely in private) by many
gay men in Europe and the United States in the late nineteenth centu-
ry 4 4 First and foremost, the Uranian lifestyle meant (at least for Ned)
a "homoeroticism [that] was an essential stimulus to everything of sub-
stance that he undertook." 45 Of great secondary importance, however,
the Uranian outlook on life often went hand in hand with the tenets of
"Aestheticism" - a philosophy directly in the American public eye (as
newspaper coverage and satirical cartoons make clear) as early as
1882, when Oscar Wilde embarked on an epic speaking tour of the
United States to champion the central Aesthetic tenet of "art for art's
sake."'46
As mainstream Anglo-American society would learn in the final
decades of the century, many famous Aesthetes - and the artists
they lauded, including John Keats, Lord Byron, and later, Lord
Tennyson - shared an affinity for same-sex intimacy and admired its
acceptance in the ancient world, especially Greece. 47 (Such beliefs ran
directly contrary to late-nineteenth-century notions of "progress"; 48
they often represented a near-sacrilegious rejection of the widespread
ascendance of science over art.4 9 )
Ned had been, from a relatively young age, "an impassioned
Hellenist who found in ancient Greece the philosophical moorings nec-
44 See SPENCER, supra note 38, at 306-o7.
45 Thomas K. Hubbard, Ned Warren's Passion: The Life and Work of a Uranian Connoisseur,
22 ARION 145, 146 (2015) (reviewing THE COLLECTED WORKS & COMMISSIONED BIOG-
RAPHY OF EDWARD PERRY WARREN (Michael Matthew Kaylor ed., 2013)).
46 Colman, supra note 17, at 445; see id. at 443-56. Ned was enchanted by Wilde and his
views, much to Sam's chagrin; indeed, Sam tried to dissuade Ned from going to New York to
meet Wilde, even though the poet had met with countless luminaries during his trip to the United
States. See Sox, supra note 18, at 13. This, too, suggests early concern on Sam's part about dan-
gers that Ned might face because of his sexuality.
47 See CHARLES UPCHURCH, BEFORE WILDE: SEX BETWEEN MEN IN BRITAIN'S AGE
OF REFORM 5 1-52 (2009).
48 As Ned's longtime friend, the writer George Santayana, would later explain in a lecture-
essay:
Science was a mighty word [in late nineteenth-century Boston]. The great future of in-
dustry loomed vaguely but magnificently before you, and any ulterior rebellion against
it ... was put aside as unthinkable. Unthinkable was a favorite word in those days.
Wealth and Morality dominated the scene from their granite pedestals, like ponderous
Victorian statutes . ...
GREEN, supra note 13, at 76 (second omission in original) (quoting George Santayana, Glimpses
of Old Boston (1932), reprinted in GEORGE SANTAYANA'S AMERICA 37, 39 (James Ballowe ed.,
1967)).
49 Id. ("These were the idols the aesthetes meant to pull down as they purified the temple of
the mind.").
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essary to make sense of his own unconventional sexuality." 0 (Further,
since his time at Harvard College, he had been drawn to the homo-
erotic poetry of Shelley, Wilde, and especially Swinburne.) Sam, of
course, was acquainted with his brother's interests and would have
grown increasingly alarmed as popular associations between those in-
terests and "homosexuality" emerged onto the cultural landscape in the
I88as. As early as I88I, for example, a popular Gilbert & Sullivan op-
eretta called Patience linked the Classics, the Aesthetes, and same-sex
passion: one character, a "Wildean aesthete" named Bunthorne, sang
about thinly veiled same-sex tendencies in lyrics concerning "an at-
tachment d la Plato." 1
The dangers for Ned would grow significantly over the course of
the I88as, even as - and perhaps especially because - he fled to
England seeking the life he imagined. Historian Alison Hennegan re-
counts the most worrisome legal development of the time period for
men engaged in same-sex intimacy:
The provisions of [England's] '885 Criminal Law Amendment Act, with
its utter indifference to the public or private nature of sexual exchanges
between men, removed at a stroke the traditional equation of private
space with safe space. From [that point] on, homosexual domesticity [be-
came] a source of danger. Shared lives leave physical traces - letters, di-
aries, pictures or photographs, gifts of books (or cigarette cases) with lov-
ing inscriptions - all these are perilous. They are the proof, the evidence
(both these words now appropriately carrying heavy legal overtones) of a
living relationship. Any of the above, left carelessly lying about, and seen
by hostile eyes, imperil their owner, sender, or giver.5 2
In the years following the passage of this law, popularly known as the
Labouchbre Amendment, the risks for Ned would only grow.5 3 The
two-year period between the death of the Warren family patriarch in
1888 and Sam's publication of The Right to Privacy brought a quick
succession of potentially dangerous developments. Newly flush, Ned
began to use his newly available yearly stipend from the family trust5 4
to travel extensively - primarily to regions that had become strongly
5o Hubbard, supra note 45, at 146.
51 ROBB, supra note 38, at lo5; see also id. at 147 (concerning "tell-tale" references to "Plato"
or "Socrates" in gay correspondence of the time period).
52 Alison Hennegan, Hea[rith and Home: Wilde Domestic Space, 27 SIGNS 881, 887 (2002)
(footnote omitted).
3 See, e.g., SHOWALTER, supra note 32, at IO6 ("Homosexuality was ... a topic of considera-
ble scientific and legal interest in 1886."); see also id. at 1o7 (arguing that Robert Louis
Stevenson's 1886 novel, The Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, is essentially "a case study
of male hysteria" and "can most persuasively be read as a fable of fin-de-sicle homosexual
panic").
54 GREEN, supra note 13, at 88.
5 Hubbard, supra note 45, at 150.
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associated with homosexuality5 6 Moreover, Ned threw his efforts into
collecting Greek vases and similar antiquities, many featuring explicit
homosexual imagery - and proceeded to initiate correspondence on
the subject with the Boston Museum in July ]89o.51 Probably most
worrisome, from Sam's perspective, was Ned's 1889 discovery and
April 1890 lease of a grand estate in Sussex, named Lewes House,
which Ned converted into a sort of Uranian Neverland populated by
Aesthetes and their guests. 58
It is difficult to say exactly how much Sam knew about Ned's plans
for Lewes House, but it seems that the rest of the Warren family began
to harbor (well-founded) suspicions about Ned's same-sex attraction
much earlier, probably during - if not before - the years he spent at
Oxford in the mid-I88os, and certainly after Ned met his eventual
long-time companion, John Marshall, while still in school there.59 In-
deed, Ned repeatedly took Marshall to meet and spend time with the
family, and it became clear fairly quickly that the two were something
akin to what we might call "partners" today.60
In any event, Sam would certainly have known that Lewes
House was a large property requiring maintenance - and thus
vulnerable to the potentially prying eyes of domestic employees.
Sam surely knew of Ned's plans to fill the house with expensive
Greek art; from the moment Ned began to draw on the family trust
in 1888, there were recurring arguments between Sam and Ned
over the latter's expenditures on Greek art - much of which would
likely have been deemed "obscene" by the average viewer.6 1 Perhaps
most importantly, Sam had reason to believe that Ned himself
might be careless about the public's discovery of his sexuality 62 and/or
56 GREEN, supra note 13, at 114, 125.
57 Id. at 125. One can imagine Sam's concern about such correspondence, especially given
that Ned would donate many valuable Greek antiquities to American museums "not so much for
the few who would love them, he said, as against the many who would not." Id. at 107.
8 See NICHOLAS C. EDSALL, TOWARD STONEWALL: HOMOSEXUALITY AND SOCIETY
IN THE MODERN WESTERN WORLD 188 (2003) ("[T]he sheltered, all-male setting of an Oxford
college suited Warren perfectly, and he spent much of his later life attempting to replicate a like
environment for himself and his friends."); GREEN, supra note 13, at 112, Il7-Ig.
59 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 95-97.
60 Id. at 40-43, 90, 95-97, 112-13, 129, 134.
61 Id. at 117, 125.
62 Ned, who recognized his own lack of perceptiveness as to the emotional states of other peo-
ple, was likely unaware of the full force of the gathering cultural storm. He did not read the daily
news, rarely interacted with people outside his social network at Oxford and, later, Lewes House,
and made repeated impulsive decisions with apparent disregard for likely public reaction. See id.
at 121 (on Ned's lack of interest in politics); id. at i 16 (news); id. at 117 (indifference to society);
id. at iig (lack of correspondence with outsiders). But see id. at 114 ("There was an atmosphere
of secrecy, an anxiety about security, concerning many things at Lewes House."); id. at iig (de-
scribing Warren as "very secretive" and "always locking things up" at Lewes House).
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what went on at Lewes House 63 - a concern that was increasingly
warranted. 64
In short, Sam would have understood, in the years leading up to his
writing of The Right to Privacy, that Ned's ostentatious, homosocial,
upper-class life of leisure carried on among a colorful group of artists
and other bachelors would have made Ned an attractive and easy tar-
get for anyone with a personal, political, or financial axe to grind.65
Indeed, in certain respects, Sam might have better understood the so-
ciocultural landscape and political dynamics bearing on Ned's well-
being - even from across the Atlantic - than did his younger broth-
er.6 6 What was a self-appointed guardian to do? 67
IV. PROSECUTIONS AND PREVENTION
The law took note of the cultural developments discussed above.
Indeed, Oscar Wilde's 1895 prosecution for "gross indecency" made so
dramatic an impression on the Anglo-American public in large part
because it was the highest-profile legal intervention into same-sex rela-
tions of the nineteenth century. (Historian Alan Sinfield describes the
conviction as a moment in which "the entire, vaguely disconcerting
nexus of effeminacy, leisure, idleness, immorality, luxury, insouciance,
decadence and aestheticism" was transformed into "a brilliantly precise
63 Though it is unclear to what degree Sam would have known this, many guests at Lewes
House would be young men of working-class backgrounds, of the sort that upper-class "pederasts"
were increasingly accused of luring into a life of deviance. UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at r89; see
also SPENCER, supra note 38, at 281.
64 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 114-15. Ned vacillated between lashing out at American
people and institutions of which he disapproved and zealously guarding his privacy, even to the
point of "hypersensitiv[ity] in resenting intrusions on his privacy." Id. at 107. He "hated newspa-
pers and reporters." Id.
65 Id. at I17. See generally MCLAREN, supra note 15.
66 GREEN, supra note 13, at 212 ("Ned observed in his autobiography, with apparent compla-
cency, that he was generally known, or supposed, to be unaware of what other people were think-
ing."); id. at 117 ("No woman entered [Lewes House] except as a servant, and the town was quite
mystified by the establishment - or so the establishment complacently supposed."). The absence
of female figures in this time period, the beginning of "fin-de-siicle homosexual panic,"
SHOWALTER, supra note 32, at IO7, was something of which people took notice. Cf. id. at ro7-ag
(noting that reviewers of Robert Louis Stevenson's novel The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr.
Hyde - a story with the many strong homosexual undertones identified by Showalter - was
criticized by various reviewers on the basis that "no woman's name occurs in the book, no ro-
mance is even suggested in it," and/or that the author "is a boy who has no mind to play with
girls," id. at lo8).
67 Sam's concerns would have been especially acute given that this was happening at a cultur-
al moment when "radical, feminist, and working-class critiques of upper-class masculinity [had
become] strongest" and when an unprecedented proliferation of sexual scandals was fueled by
anger "directed at an upper class that made its own rules and [had long been] allowed to evade
the laws that constrained" the members of an increasingly vocal majority. UPCHURCH, supra
note 47, at 53.
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image" in the Anglo-American cultural imagination. 6 ) But while the
Wilde trials were unprecedented in public impact,69 the law had cer-
tainly been deployed against gay men before. 0
Of particular note for my narrative of The Right to Privacy, the
late I880s saw a dramatic rise in criminal prosecutions of "sexually
deviant" men from "respectable" families. As historian Charles
Upchurch notes, the Anglo-American homosexual "scandal trials of the
late nineteenth century . . . marked a new way of politicizing sex be-
tween men" - facilitated by the interrelated developments of the
"working class [beginning] to read newspapers en masse" and the
emergence of "the 'new journalism' of the later nineteenth century
[that] changed the rules for reporting sex between men.""
Sam Warren, a worldly and well-informed professional involved in
a wide range of public affairs, would have been well informed about
the various homosexual scandals of the i88as, particularly in light of
Sam's suspicions about Ned's sexuality. These episodes would have
been especially alarming for Sam after Ned's return to Boston in
1887-1888, by which point the Aesthete's Uranian outlook on life had
become emphatic and all-encompassing. 72
On the heels of Ned's visit to Boston - during which any number
of conversations about Ned's private life might have occurred - Sam
would learn of the so-called "Cleveland Street Scandal" of 1889-1890,
a series of "sensational trials" concerning "upper-class men paying for
sex with telegraph delivery boys."7 3 This might well have been the fi-
nal nudge necessary for Sam to decide he would take some sort of ac-
tion. 7 4  The status-obsessed man of the political and business world
68 ALAN SINFIELD, THE WILDE CENTURY: EFFEMINACY, OSCAR WILDE, AND THE
QUEER MOMENT 3 (1994).
69 See generally Colman, supra note 17, at 443-5 6.
70 See JONATHAN DOLLIMORE, SEXUAL DISSIDENCE: AUGUSTINE TO WILDE, FREUD
To FOUCAULT 67 (iggi) ("In fact, the transition [in the popular conception of those acting on
same-sex attraction from morally lapsed 'sodomite' to intrinsically pathological 'homosexual']
was more complicated than [much scholarly work] allows, occurring over a greater period of time,
and even then (and still now) with cultural and class distinctions. But it is true that, by the time
of Wilde, homosexuality could be regarded as rooted in a person's identity and as pathologically
pervading all aspects of his being.").
71 UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 130.
72 The discontent Ned felt during this period was one he could not keep to himself, writing,
for example, to his companion John Marshall: "Here with cold winds and snow, the traditions of
Puritanism, the ugliness of the men and the absence of aesthetic sympathy, all Greece is frozen
out." Hubbard, supra note 45, at 150.
7 UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at i; see also SPENCER, supra note 38, at 278-80.
74 This scandal would later be explicitly linked with Wilde, and thus Aestheticism. Upon
Wilde's r8go publication of The Picture of Dorian Gray, The Scots Observer would declare that
Wilde had written the novel "for 'outlawed noblemen and telegraph boys' - a blatant allusion to
the Cleveland Street scandal." ROBB, supra note 38, at lo. Ned was persistently secretive with
Sam about many aspects of his life, and Sam might well have thought that Ned was the sort of
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understood the growing potency of rumors about his brother 5 - ru-
mors that, if investigated or leveraged by the wrong person, 6 could
cause immeasurable harm not only to Ned, but to the entire Warren
family 7
In reading The Right to Privacy against the backdrop sketched
above, many of the article's otherwise prosaic passages gain a new res-
onance. I urge the reader to carefully parse the complete text of the
article and reach her own conclusions, even as I highlight and flesh out
a handful of excerpts here:
[While public figures], in varying degrees, have renounced the right to
live their lives screened from public observation[,] ... [p]eculiarities of
manner and person [of] the ordinary individual should be free from
comment .... .
As noted above, most accounts of The Right to Privacy focus on Sam's
purported ire at press intrusions into the lives of the socially and polit-
ically prominent Bayards. 9 Sam's experience as a new member of
that family after his 1882 marriage to Mabel Bayard might well have
opened his eyes to the power of the press; that experience does not,
however, correspond to any significant degree with the concerns ex-
pressed in the '890 article about the privacy of those who - unlike
the Bayards - had not "renounced the right to live their lives
screened from public observation."
The intensity and complexity of life, attendant upon advancing civili-
zation, have rendered necessary some retreat from the world, and man,
under the refining influence of culture, has become more sensitive to
publicity .... .so
Ned had essentially retreated from the world by '8go, finding Boston
(and cities in general) both distasteful and anxiety inducing. As any-
one meeting him would immediate gather, his anxiety was one of the
moneyed gentleman who patronized establishments like the Cleveland Street brothel. Further, it
was during that period that Ned wrote his first gay love story, A Tale of Pausanian Love (not pub-
lished for another forty years). GREEN, supra note 13, at 97. One can only guess as to whether
Sam perhaps stumbled across an errant page or partial draft somewhere in the family's Mount
Vernon Street mansion; in any event, Ned's dedication to his secret literary project would surely
have been discussed by the members of the family at some point, if only in euphemistic terms.
7 See id. at 115 ("According to Boston rumour, [English barrister Matthew] Prichard had been
'picked up' by Warren in Rome, having had to leave England because of the Wilde scandal.").
76 Cf., e.g., SPENCER, supra note 38, at 282 ("If I catch you again with [Oscar Wilde] I will
make a public scandal in a way you little dream of." (quoting a letter to Bosie Douglas from
Bosie's father, the Marquess of Queensberry)).
77 See, e.g., UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 203 ("Symonds's family also worked to ensure that
all copies of the first edition of [his co-authored treatise] Sexual Inversion, bearing Symonds's
name, were withdrawn from publication in order to protect the family's reputation.").
78 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 215.
9 See supra p. 130.
8o Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
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defining characteristics of his personality. The condition that chroni-
cally plagued his health from 1885 onward would soon be "medically
diagnosed" as "neurasthenia," a condition that was commonly linked,
in the popular imagination, with sexual "deviance." 1
Such connections received a "scientific" imprimatur from the lead-
ing i88os treatise on "sexual inverts," Richard von Krafft-Ebing's
Psychopathia Sexualis.8 2 In the 1889 edition of Krafft-Ebing's book,
for instance, the author devotes special attention to a case study pur-
portedly illustrating the "defective organization of the highest cerebral
centres" of "an abnormal and defective person"81 who identified as an
"aesthete" and reportedly wished to spend his session with Krafft-
Ebing discussing painting and poetry.8 4 The man under examination
was described as having a "shy, effeminate manner" and nervous
disposition. 5
To satisfy a prurient taste the details of sexual relations are spread broad-
cast in the columns of the daily papers. 6
In this early passage in The Right to Privacy, Warren expresses con-
cern about the exposure of "the details of sexual relations" - immedi-
ately after noting a court case that involved nothing of the sort. Rath-
er, as Warren briefly recounts, there had been "a somewhat notorious
case brought ... in New York a few months ago [that had] directly in-
volved the consideration of the right [of a photographer] of circulating
portraits."' Yet, as Warren points out, the law concerning the rights
and duties associated with commissioned photography was essentially
settled.""
The New York case Warren cites, then, sticks out as something of a
non sequitur to the rhetoric surrounding it. That rhetoric resonates to
a far greater degree with a subject Sam could not realistically address
in a public forum, for reasons of social convention: the atmosphere of
widespread anxiety about sexual "deviants" in the late i88os. As noted
above, the late nineteenth century bore witness to several "infamous
81 See BEDERMAN, supra note 36, at 14.
82 R. VON KRAFFT-EBING, PSYCHOPATHIA SEXUALIS (Charles Gilbert Chaddock trans.,
1894). Although it was written in German and only translated into English in 1892, Sam Warren
would have been familiar with its findings as summarized in various media - if not the text of
the actual book itself. German, like French - the latter of which appeared in large, untranslated
blocks of text in The Right to Privacy, see, e.g., Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 214 n.I, 215
n.I, 216 n.I, 218 n.I - was often required of the sort of men who matriculated at Harvard in the
late nineteenth century.
83 KRAFFT-EBING, supra note 82, at 308.
84 Id. at 307; see UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 198-99.
85 KRAFFT-EBING, supra note 82, at 307.
86 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
87 Id. at 195-96 (footnote omitted) (citing Manola v. Stevens, an unreported 1890 case in New
York Supreme Court, see Manola v. Stevens, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 1890, at 2).
88 See id. at 208-IO.
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trials" of gay men, which invariably received a "sustained level" of
public attention. 9 Such attention was driven by news coverage "much
more sensational and readily accessible"9 0 than that of even a few de-
cades earlier, when newspapers had shown reluctance to "mix up the
name of a highly respectable individual with so atrocious an accusa-
tion."9 1 In the new cultural landscape, Sam correctly understood,
Ned's private life might, through a single slip-up or personal falling-
out - something Sam might accurately have deemed a reasonable
possibility - become very public, very quickly
Even gossip apparently harmless, when widely and persistently circulated,
is potent for evil. It both belittles and perverts. It belittles by inverting
the relative importance of things, thus dwarfing the thoughts and aspira-
tions of a people [by drawing attention to] the misfortunes and frailties of
our neighbors. 9 2
In light of the risks identified above, Sam uses this passage as a clever
way to turn the tables against those who might be inclined to expose
Ned's status as a sexual "invert," recharacterizing the would-be invad-
er of privacy as the figure who has inverted the natural state of things,
by prioritizing private sexual practices over more important political
matters. He further characterizes anyone seeking to expose such traits
as, essentially, a bully, preying on the "misfortunes and frailties" of
others - a line of rhetoric that could be found in the portion of medi-
cal discourse advocating for treatment, not criminal punishment, of
homosexuals.
[N]umerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction that
"what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house-
tops. "'-
[But the] design of the law must be to protect those persons with whose
affairs the community has no legitimate concern, from being dragged into
an undesirable and undesired publicity and to protect all persons, whatso-
ever; their position or station, from having matters which they may
properly prefer to keep private, made public against their will. 9 4
As mentioned above, the late nineteenth century saw an "increased
frequency of application of the law" to same-sex intimacy; this was fa-
cilitated by changes to extortion law that "allow[ed] men to bring their
89 UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 5.
90 Id. at 4.
91 Id. at 133 (quoting newspaper coverage). Further, by the time the "homosexual panic" hit
Anglo-American culture in the 1880s, the techniques that many judges had once used to help
members of the moneyed classes minimize potentially ruinous publicity had ceased in the face of
widespread public interest and moral outrage. See id. at rog.
92 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
93 Id. at '95.
94 Id. at 214-15-
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social betters into court on their word alone."'9 Even more instrumen-
tal to this development was Labouchbre's "famous amendment" to
English criminal law in 1885, expressly extending severe penalties for
same-sex intimacy "in public or private,"9 6 and, further, eliminating the
evidentiary requirement that a nonparticipating party to an unlawful
same-sex encounter give testimony in order for the state to secure a
conviction.97 Such legal "reform," fueled by the newly emphatic social
stigma associated with homosexuality, earned the 1885 Labouchbre
Amendment an ominous nickname: the "Blackmailer's Charter."98
Ned's wealth and increasingly ostentatious displays of his ideology
and sexuality made him an appealing target for potential blackmail,
prosecution, or both. Such campaigns often rested on "intimate let-
ters," a recurring theme in the actual or barely averted gay scandals of
the late nineteenth century.9 9 It often happened that incriminating
materials fell into the wrong hands 00 - and, to the extent one could
not enjoin their use, could prove devastating to their authors.
This backdrop provides an intuitive way to make sense of Sam
Warren's near-obsessive focus in The Right to Privacy on the principle
of "limited publication" - the right to prevent others from publishing
material from letters to lists, whether or not independently protectable
under intellectual property law.101 Persecution of homosexuals during
this time period was especially likely where there was a "paper trail,"
making Ned more vulnerable than the average nineteenth-century gay
man because of his extensive, if largely unpublished, writing.102
Ned's immediate audience was apparently "like-minded friends
who shared his own aesthetic leanings and erotic tastes . ... "1 (In-
deed, confidential circulation of often-allusive works was a common
practice among nineteenth-century gays and lesbians with literary - if
95 UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 15.
96 Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885, 48 & 49 Vict. c. 69, § ii (emphasis added).
97 UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 93.
98 Joseph Bristow, Symonds's History, Ellis's Heredity: Sexual Inversion, in SEXOLOGY IN
CULTURE: LABELLING BODIES AND DESIRES 79, 91 (Lucy Bland & Laura Doan eds., 1998).
99 1]n the summer of 1894 some passionate letters from Wilde to [Alfred] Bosie [Douglas]
came into [Bosie's father's, the Marquess of Queensberry's] hands," triggering the chain of events
that would lead to Wilde's downfall. Circumstances like these were all too common, even with
the discretion that many gay men and lesbians used in their written correspondence. SPENCER,
supra note 38, at 283; see also id. at 281 ("Douglas was being blackmailed because of an indiscreet
letter he had written").
100 See, e.g., Hubbard, supra note 45, at 147 ("[Ned] had obsessive crushes on other boys at his
grammar school, including an older, more athletic boy upon whose house he surreptitiously spied,
retrieving his papers from the wastebasket [only to be caught by] the family's French maid ....
101 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 2 11-12.
102 See supra notes 16 and 74; see also Bentinck-Smith, supra note 16, at 687 (discussing "the
three volumes of Ned Warren's magnum opus, A Defence of Uranian Love ([written in 1887 and
published in] 1928), as well as lesser works").
103 Hubbard, supra note 45, at 157.
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only epistolary - inclinations.1 04) Yet Ned also wished for his poetry
to be read, especially in the 188as and 1890s, before his interests shift-
ed markedly from the literary arts to the visual realm. During his pe-
riod of productivity as a poet, from 1882 when he was still living in
Boston and attending Harvard College to 1902, he would use the
pseudonym "Arthur Lyon Raile" - a convention he observed for "any
publications of a homoerotic character." 1 0 5  Of course, few writers of
any era have managed to keep their noms de plume secret for long, es-
pecially when attached to high-profile and controversial works. Al-
though Ned's work would never achieve a substantial readership, Sam
had good reason to be concerned about the possible use of Ned's poet-
ry - whether published or unpublished - against him. The Right to
Privacy attempts to address this concern.
Sam's idiosyncratic invocation of legal authority, especially on the
issue of "limited publication," makes his focus on this narrow issue all
the more striking. In advancing the proposition, for example, that
"[t]he common law secures to each individual the right of determining,
ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall
be communicated to others,"10 6 Sam cites the then-century-old case
Millar v. Taylor'1 - and the dissenting judge's opinion therein, no
less.108 His use of this hoary British case was of a piece with the gen-
eral legal methodology of the argument, which relied almost exclusive-
ly on English case law and treatises (even on many issues where Amer-
ican case law and treatises provided ample guidance) along with
several untranslated excerpts from French law.10 9
It is possible that this was merely part of Warren's argumentative
strategy (some scholars have argued that "the hierarchical nature of
British society has resulted in greater respect for privacy not only in
governmental affairs but in society at large"110 ) though such an argu-
ment makes for a somewhat disingenuous legal argument, obscuring
the "fairly radical" character of Warren's position under American
law.111 That Sam's argument was more tenuous than he suggested,
and so reliant on English precedent even where American precedent
104 ROBB, supra note 38, at 136 ("Texts that did appear in their author's lifetime were often
privately printed for a handful of friends . . . ."). Perhaps Ned and his Uranian friends simply
wrote poetry "as a form of sublimation," putting it in print "for themselves and for each other, to
share their poetry and their obsession with like-minded men." SPENCER, supra note 38, at 307.
105 Hubbard, supra note 45, at 151.
106 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 198.
107 98 Eng. Rep. 20I (1769).
108 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at Ig8 n.2 (citing Millar, 98 Eng. Rep. at 242 (Yates, J.,
dissenting)).
109 See supra note 82.
110 Beaney, supra note 5, at 258 n.i8 (citing EDWARD A. SHILS, THE TORMENT OF SECRE-
CY (1956)).
1I See Richards, supra note 13, at 1303.
20I6] 1145
HARVARD LAW REVIEW FORUM
existed, suggests (i) that he was willing to potentially compromise his
professional credibility or reputation for careful legal analysis, only
bolstering the likelihood that he had a personal stake in the matter to
counterbalance these risks; and/or (2) that he was writing, at least in
part, with an eye to the country that had become Ned's primary home
and potential location of victimization (and where, just as importantly,
ideas espoused by the intellectuals and professionals of Boston, per-
haps to the exclusion of other American cities, did wield some influ-
ence on the direction of elite thinking 12).
The allowance of [certain defamation-related] damages would seem to be a
recognition that the invasion upon the honor of the family is an injury to
the parent's person .... 113
I conclude my quoting of The Right to Privacy with this passage -
though I might include many others that will likely jump out at the in-
terested reader, equipped with knowledge about Ned - because it
represents one of the relatively few instances of what might be called
distancing language ("would seem to be a recognition") in Warren's
otherwise forceful and often-unqualified rhetoric. Whereas, through-
out most of the article, Warren is unabashedly direct in stating his
views, about the importance of privacy and the harms arising from its
violation, he suddenly becomes guarded when the subject of injury to
familial honor arises. This was perhaps one of his few attempts to de-
personalize an article in which, for a reader familiar with Ned's idio-
syncrasies, much of the rhetoric employed by Sam to make his argu-
ment might seem quite painfully "on the nose."
One possibility is that Sam's awkward specificity represented mere
clumsiness and/or a lack of objectivity in a piece apparently never ed-
ited by Brandeis (who Sam himself had long acknowledged was the
"brains" of the team) because of the future Justice's general indiffer-
ence to the article. Alternatively, the article's superficially artless par-
ticularity might have been a savvy, strategic shot across the bow to the
many Bostonians already in the know, to varying degrees, about
Ned. 1 1 4 (Indeed, one wonders if Sam's comment, early in the article,
that "no generous impulse can survive under [gossip's] blighting influ-
112 See Sox, supra note 18, at 13 (quoting an Oscar Wilde lecture describing Boston as "the
only city in America which influenced thought in Europe").
113 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 194 n.5.
114 See GREEN, supra note 13, at 41 (discussing derision directed at Ned by other Boston chil-
dren for being a "sissy" and, later, for his sexual "abnormality"); see also Hubbard, supra note 45,
at 147 ("In grammar school [Ned] was ridiculed for wearing his sister's tasseled boots and had few
friends, save for a rather effeminate boy he called 'Lucy."') It seems likely, too, that Ned might
also have made overtures to other undergraduates at Harvard, based on his later comments like
the following: "My friends [at Harvard] were affectionate, but their affection did not pass beyond
a certain point, or had not as yet." Id. at 148. "One may surmise that [Ned] hoped to find some-
thing in the Oxford experience that he had sought in vain at Harvard." Id.
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ence"115 was a warning to Bostonians that the Warren family's philan-
thropic pursuits throughout the region might quickly cease if any of its
members, especially its least public and most vulnerable, were target-
ed.) Or perhaps Sam was trying to split the difference, using examples
and language that would evoke Ned for those already familiar with his
proclivities - while seizing on popular sentiment, recent litigation,
and purported coauthorship ("It is our purpose to consider whether the
existing law affords a principle which can properly be invoked to pro-
tect the privacy of the individual . . . ."116) so that the argument would
seem both generalizable and compelling to readers who had no partic-
ular familiarity with the Warren family.
Of course, even if fraternal loyalty did factor into Sam's decision to
pursue the project of The Right to Privacy, he naturally had his own,
more selfish interests in helping Ned to avoid public "disgrace." The
consequences of having a family member exposed as a "sodomite" ex-
tended beyond shame, in the narrow sense some might (sadly) still be
able to relate to today.1 1 7 Such a revelation might suggest that an en-
tire family's blood was "tainted" - at least according to Psychopathia
Sexualis, which declared: "In almost all cases where an examination of
the physical and mental peculiarities of the ancestors and blood rela-
tions has been possible, neuroses, psychoses, degenerative signs etc
have been found in the families."" Perhaps for this reason, one
scholar has written: "at any moment in the I9 th century someone,
somewhere, was burning the papers of a homosexual relative."119
To be sure, nothing I write here forecloses the possibility that Sam's
experiences as a new member of the Warren-Bayard family informed
or even partly motivated his writing of The Right to Privacy. Indeed,
to the extent that homosexuality was widely described as a "hereditary
taint, '"120 it might well have damaged the reputation of the politically
prominent Warren-Bayard family - and cast a shadow of suspicion
on Sam's children with Mabel - if Ned's "secret" had gotten out.
115 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 2, at 196.
116 Id. at '97.
117 Cf SPENCER, supra note 38, at 282 ("In spring 1894, Queensberry wrote to his son [Bosie
Douglas] begging him to stop seeing Wilde: 'It must either cease or I will disown you and stop all
money supplies."').
118 Id. at 293 (quoting KRAFFT-EBING, supra note 82, at 226).
119 ROBB, supra note 38, at 137.
120 UPCHURCH, supra note 47, at 198.
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V. EPILOGUE
If my account of Sam's motivations for writing The Right to Priva-
cy is plausible, then the article would seem to acquire a new and spe-
cial resonance on its 125th anniversary The rhetoric and reasoning in
the piece can be traced, 12 1 link by link, albeit with important modifica-
tions along the way, to Supreme Court decisions that cumulatively es-
121 See HUw BEVERLEY-SMITH, THE COMMERCIAL APPROPRIATION OF PERSONALITY
150 n.29 (2002) ("Although Prosser stated that the [Warren & Brandeis] article had little immedi-
ate effect on the law, [David] Leebron has persuasively shown that the article's impact in academ-
ic circles, and in the courts, was immediate and significant." (citations omitted) (citing Prosser,
supra note 9, at 5; David W. Leebron, The Right to Privacy's Place in the Intellectual History of
Tort Law, 41 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 792-94 (1991)). Scholarly approval of this view of the
article as "catalytic" is substantial. See, e.g., Amy Gajda, Judging Journalism: The Turn Toward
Privacy and Judicial Regulation of the Press, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 1039, 1044-45 (2009) (arguing
that "when recognition of privacy as a legally protectable interest was only fledgling," id. at 1044,
Warren's "landmark article" called for robust tort protection, id. at 1045); id. at 1045-46 ("In the
years following publication of The Right to Privacy, . . . courts considered more explicitly wheth-
er to give privacy more direct and substantial protection."); W.A. Parent, Recent Work on the
Concept of Privacy, 20 AM. PHIL. Q. 341, 341 (1983) (tracing post-ig6o legal articulations of "pri-
vacy," which grew out of an earlier "definition of privacy as a condition of being let alone [that
had] dominated privacy jurisprudence" and was "explained largely by the extraordinary influence
of the Warren and Brandeis essay"). Judge Cooley's notion of "the right to be let alone" has fea-
tured prominently in privacy jurisprudence, but arguably because of the Warren and Brandeis
article's elaboration on it. See, e.g., Schuyler v. Curtis, 15 N.Y.S. 787, 788 (Sup. Ct. 189') ("It is
true that there is no reported decision which goes to this extent in maintaining the right of priva-
cy, and in that respect this is a novel case. But the gradual extension of the law in the direction of
affording the most complete redress for injury to individual rights makes this an easy step from
reported decisions much similar in principle. In a recent article of the Harvard Law Review, enti-
tled 'The Right to Privacy,' we find an able summary of the extension and development of the
law of individual rights, which well deserves and will repay the perusal of every lawyer. Among
other things it says: 'This development of the law was inevitable. The intense intellectual and
emotional life, and the heightening of sensations, which came with the advance of civilization,
made it clear to men that only a part of the pain, pleasure, and profit of life lay in physical things.
Thoughts, emotions, and sensations demanded legal recognition, and the beautiful capacity for
growth which characterizes the common law enabled the judges to afford the requisite protection
without the interposition of the legislature. Recent inventions and business methods call attention
to the next step which must be taken for the protection of the person, and for securing to the indi-
vidual what Judge Cooley calls the 'right to be let alone."' (citation omitted) (quoting Warren &
Brandeis, supra note 2, at 195)), aff'd, ig N.Y.S. 264 (Gen. Term 1892). Perhaps notably, Judge
Cooley's invocation of the legal import of being "let alone" appears in no published Supreme
Court decision until the year after the Warren and Brandeis article featured Cooley's notion so
prominently. See Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 ('89') ("As well said by Judge
Cooley: 'The right to one's person may be said to be a right of complete immunity; to be let
alone.' Cooley on Torts, 29."). By the ig6os, the phrase appears to have been more closely associ-
ated with Brandeis - and, to a lesser degree, Warren - than with Judge Cooley. See, e.g., Erwin
N. Griswold, The Right to Be Let Alone, 55 Nw. U. L. REV. 216, 216 (1960) ("It is in this setting
that I want to place 'the right to be let alone.' It is quite true that this phrase cannot be found in
the Constitution. But it is implicit in many of the provisions of the Constitution and in the philo-
sophic background out of which the Constitution was formulated. Probably the most familiar
statement is that of Justice Brandeis in his dissent in the Olmstead case .... .").
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tablished a constitutional right to personal autonomy.122 Initially, the
article's influence was felt primarily in state court decisions concerning
invasions of privacy by private parties; however, it would secure a
place in constitutional jurisprudence when, in 1928, then-Justice
Brandeis penned a powerful dissent echoing key principles of The
Right to Privacy in the Fourth Amendment case of Olmstead v. United
States.123 Brandeis's reasoning in Olmstead, along with the article it-
self, would be invoked by the Supreme Court in important criminal
procedure decisions over the next few decades. 124  But the notion
122 See Jamal Greene, The So-Called Right to Privacy, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715, 718-19
(2010) ("Part I [of this piece] briefly chronicles the history of the right [to privacy], from Samuel
Warren's and Louis Brandeis's celebrated recognition of the privacy tort in 18go, to Justice
Douglas's opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut, through its judicial invocations in Griswold's prog-
eny and Bowers [v. Hardwick], and at last to its conspicuous absence in cases like Lawrence [v.
Texas] and Gonzales v. Carhart. This Part argues that the gradual transformation of the right to
make fundamental personal decisions from an aspect of privacy emerging from the penumbrae of
the Bill of Rights into an aspect of constitutional liberty and equality protected by the Due Pro-
cess Clause is now complete." (footnotes omitted)); Richards, supra note 13, at 1296 ("Brandeis is
also famous (though less so) for his Olmstead dissent - a document which introduced modern
concepts of privacy into constitutional law, and ultimately led not only to the 'reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy' test that governs Fourth Amendment law, but also shaped the constitutional right
to privacy recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut and Roe v. Wade." (footnotes omitted)); see also
FRANK J. COLUCCI, JUSTICE KENNEDY'S JURISPRUDENCE (2009) (examining, inter alia, Jus-
tice Kennedy's importation of rhetoric and doctrine from, and arguable recasting of, "privacy"
cases into "liberty" cases). For an out of date, but nuanced and insightful, examination of the rela-
tionship between "privacy," the "right to be left alone," "personhood" (arguably analogous to, and
perhaps originating with, Warren and Brandeis's notion of "inviolate personality"), and "personal
autonomy," see Rubenfeld, supra note i, at 752 ("It is worth recalling ... that Brandeis and
Warren traced their tort law right of privacy to an analogous but now archaic term: the individu-
al's 'inviolate personality' Whatever its genesis, 'personhood' has so invaded privacy doctrine
that it now regularly is seen either as the value underlying the right or as a synonym for the right
itself." (footnotes omitted)).
123 277 U.S. 438 (1928). For a decision illustrating and explicitly reflecting on the influence of
the article on tort law, see Cason v. Baskin, 20 SO. 2d 243, 248 (Fla. 1944) (en banc) ("Thus Messrs.
Warren and Brandeis endeavored to demonstrate, and quite successfully, that the right of privacy
was inherent in the common law and had been protected, as shown by a number of English cases,
under the guise of property rights, etc., and that the time had come for a recognition of this right
of privacy as an independent right of the individual. [Laurence H.] Eldredge in his very interest-
ing and recent book on 'Modern Tort Problems,' at page 77, says that Warren and Brandeis de-
fined the right of privacy, in substance, to be 'the right to be let alone, the right to live in a com-
munity without being held up to the public gaze if you don't want to be held up to the public
gaze."'); id. at 250 ("The common law has shown an amazing vitality and capacity for growth and
development. This is so largely because the great fundamental object and principle of the com-
mon law was the protection of the individual in the enjoyment of all his inherent and essential
rights and to afford him a legal remedy for their invasion. In the early days the rights insisted
upon by litigants were largely physical, for the protection of the individual's body from harm and
his property from being taken or damaged by others. Later on this principle was applied so as to
enable recovery of damages for mental suffering occasioned by physical injuries, and this princi-
ple was later given a wider application, as shown in the article written by Warren and Brandeis,
as well as in the [Georgia and Oregon Supreme Court] cases we have just above cited.").
124 See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 n.6 (1967) (citing The Right to Privacy to un-
derscore the importance of "the protection of a person's general right to privacy - his right to be
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of privacy would not remain confined to the realm of government
investigations.
Starting in the Ig60s - perhaps spurred by the acute threat
McCarthyism had posed to individual liberty - academic and judicial
rhetoric embraced an increasingly robust notion of "the right to priva-
cy." The principle made the decisive leap beyond criminal procedure
in the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,125 where a majority of the
Supreme Court (whose Justices cited Olmstead and even The Right to
Privacy, specifically 26) found a constitutional right to contraception
for married couples in the penumbras of various constitutional
amendments touching on privacy concerns. 127 The expansive under-
standing of "privacy" articulated in Griswold would be invoked and
extended to unmarried individuals seeking to invalidate a governmen-
tal ban on contraception, in Eisenstadt v. Baird 28 (in a majority deci-
sion grounded in important part on the Equal Protection Clause1 29).
The Griswold ruling and its progeny would later be richly (if contro-
versially) interpreted through the lens of liberty-as-self-determination,
by a three-Justice plurality whose decision carried the day in Planned
let alone by other people," id. at 350); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 1g8-gg (1957) ("We
cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a public
need that overbalances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibil-
ity placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifi-
ably encroach upon an individual's right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, reli-
gion or assembly.").
125 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
126 See id. at 494 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (citing Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dis-
senting)); id. at 5 o n.i (Black, J., dissenting) ("The phrase 'right to privacy' appears first to have
gained currency from an article written by Messrs. Warren and (later Mr. Justice) Brandeis in
1890 which urged that States should give some form of tort relief to persons whose private affairs
were exploited by others. Largely as a result of this article, some States have passed statutes cre-
ating such a cause of action, and in others state courts have done the same thing by exercising
their powers as courts of common law.... Observing that 'the right of privacy ... presses for
recognition here,' today this Court, which I did not understand to have power to sit as a court of
common law, now appears to be exalting a phrase which Warren and Brandeis used in discussing
grounds for tort relief, to the level of a constitutional rule which prevents state legislatures from
passing any law deemed by this Court to interfere with 'privacy."' (second omission in original)
(citation omitted)).
127 Id. at 484-85 (majority opinion).
128 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
129 Id. at 453 ("If under Griswold the distribution of contraceptives to married persons cannot
be prohibited, a ban on distribution to unmarried persons would be equally impermissible. It is
true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital relationship. Yet the
marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its own, but an association
of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy
means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether
to bear or beget a child.").
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Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.1 3 0  Core passages
and principles from those cases would soon take center stage in the
landmark gay-rights decisions of Lawrence v. Texas,131 United States v.
Windsor,132 and, in the 125th year after the publication of The Right to
Privacy, Obergefell v. Hodges,13 3 where the Supreme Court recognized
a fundamental constitutional right to marry someone of the same
sex. 134
It is here that the story I have told about two brothers, each tradi-
tionally relegated to the "footnotes" of history,135 takes on special reso-
nance. For a desire on Sam's part to protect his gay brother, if indeed
a motivating factor in the authorship of The Right to Privacy, would
mean that a piece published in an effort to preserve the autonomy of
one gay man was, in a circuitous but nonetheless concrete way, a 125-
year-old precursor of a Supreme Court ruling securing the protection
of a crucial right for every gay American.
There are many things about the United States in the twenty-first
century that Ned would surely dislike - some with good reason, some
due to aspects of Ned's own worldview that appear as distastefully an-
tiquated as the widespread prejudice Ned sought to escape by moving
abroad and creating a gay community at Lewes House. But one hopes
that, if Ned were alive today, in this post-Obergefell world, he would at
least entertain the possibility of building a life for himself in his home
country. He would still face prejudice, to be sure, but he would also
see the law's respect for the most important relationship in his life.
"0 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see id. at 851 ("These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are
central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right
to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of hu-
man life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under compulsion of the State."). Justice Blackmun's partial concurrence in Casey under-
scored the import of earlier case law, including the Supreme Court's 1891 invocation of the "right
to be let alone" likely prompted by the Warren and Brandeis article. See id. at 926-27
(Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part)
("The Court today reaffirms the long recognized rights of privacy and bodily integrity. As early as
1891, the Court held, '[n]o right is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded by the common
law, than the right of every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free from
all restraint or interference of others. . . .' Throughout this century, this Court also has held that
the fundamental right of privacy protects citizens against governmental intrusion in such intimate
family matters as procreation, childrearing, marriage, and contraceptive choice. These cases em-
body the principle that personal decisions that profoundly affect bodily integrity, identity, and des-
tiny should be largely beyond the reach of government." (omission in original) (citations omitted)
(quoting Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (r891), then citing Casey, 505 U.S. at
847-49, and then citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453)).
1539 U.S. 558 (2003).
132 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
133 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
134 Id. at 2608.
135 Bentinck-Smith, supra note 16, at 687.
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And, remarkably, that respect might well be, in some nonquantifiable
but eminently meaningful way, due to his brother's article - an article
that, in the poetic mirror of historical imagination, can be read and
appreciated as a piece about Ned.
